Gowri Shanker Journalist

Operation Polo
	; The State of Hyderabad in 1909 (excluding Berar)
Date	13–18 September 1948; (5 days)
Location	Hyderabad State, (parts of South and Western India)17°00′N 78°50′E
Result	Indian victory Annexation of Hyderabad to Union of India;
Belligerents
Dominion of India	Hyderabad
Commanders and leaders
Governor-General Chakravarti Rajagopalachari; Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel; Minister of Defence Baldev Singh; General Sir Roy Bucher; Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst; Lieutenant-General Rajendrasinhji Jadeja; Major General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri; Major General Ajit Rudra; Air Vice-Marshal Subroto Mukherjee;	Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan; S.A. El Edroos ; Qasim Razvi ;
Strength
35,000 Indian Armed Forces	22,000 Hyderabad State Forces; est. 200,000 irregulars (Razakars);
Casualties and losses
Less than 10 killed	Hyderabad State forces: 807 killed; unknown wounded; 1,647 POWs; Razakars: 1,373 killed; 1,911 captured;
	Sunderlal Committee: 30,000–40,000 civilians killed; Responsible observers: 200,000 civilians killed;

Operation Polo was the code name of the Hyderabad "police action" in September 1948,^[9] by the then newly independent Dominion of India against Hyderabad State.^[10] It was a military operation in which the Indian Armed Forces invaded the Nizam-ruled princely state, annexing it into the Indian Union.^[11]

At the time of Partition in 1947, the princely states of India, who in principle had self-government within their own territories, were subject to subsidiary alliances with the British, giving them control of their external relations. With the Indian Independence Act 1947, the British abandoned all such alliances, leaving the states with the option of opting for full independence.^[12]^[13] However, by 1948 almost all had acceded to either India or Pakistan. One major exception was that of the wealthiest and most powerful principality, Hyderabad, where the Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, a Muslim ruler who presided over a largely Hindu population, chose independence and hoped to maintain this with an irregular army.^[14]^: 224 The Nizam was also beset by the Telangana rebellion, which he was unable to subjugate.^[14]^: 224

In November 1947, Hyderabad signed a standstill agreement with the Dominion of India, continuing all previous arrangements except for the stationing of Indian troops in the state. Claiming that it feared the establishment of a Communist state in Hyderabad,^[15]^[16] India invaded the state in September of 1948, following a crippling economic blockade, and multiple attempts at destabilizing the state through railway disruptions, the bombing of government buildings, and raids on border villages.^[17]^[18]^[3] Subsequently, the Nizam signed an instrument of accession, joining India.^[19]

The operation led to massive violence on communal lines, at times perpetrated by the Indian Army.^[20] The Sunderlal Committee, appointed by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, concluded that between 30,000-40,000 people had died in total in the state, in a report which was not released until 2013.^[6] Other responsible observers estimated the number of deaths to be 200,000 or higher.^[7]

Background[edit]

After the Siege of Golconda by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1687, the region was renamed as Deccan Subah (due to its geographical proximity in the Deccan Plateau) and in 1713 Qamar-ud-din Khan (later known as Asaf Jah I or Nizam I) was appointed its Subahdar and bestowed with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk by the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar. Hyderabad's nominal independence is dated to 1724, when the Nizam won a military victory over a rival military appointee.^[21] In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian princely state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliance instituted by Arthur Wellesley, and was thus named as the State of Hyderabad.

The State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, was the largest and most prosperous of all the princely states in India. With annual revenues of over Rs. 9 crore,^[22] it covered 82,698 square miles (214,190 km²) of fairly homogenous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. The state had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service.^[5] Hyderabad was a multi-lingual state consisting of peoples speaking Telugu (48.2%), Marathi (26.4%), Kannada (12.3%) and Urdu (10.3%). In spite of the overwhelming Hindu majority, Hindus were severely under-represented in government, police and the military. Of 1765 officers in the State Army, 1268 were Muslims, 421 were Hindus, and 121 others were Christians, Parsis and Sikhs. Of the officials drawing a salary between Rs. 600 and 1200 per month, 59 were Muslims, 5 were Hindus and 38 were of other religions. The Nizam and his nobles, who were mostly Muslims, owned 40% of the total land in the state.^[23]^[5]

When the British departed from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the sub-continent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan, or staying on as an independent state.^[12] As stated by Sardar Patel at a press conference in January 1948, "As you are all aware, on the lapse of Paramountcy every Indian State became a separate independent entity."^[24] In India, a small number of states, including Hyderabad, declined to join the new dominion.^[25]^[26] In the case of Pakistan, accession happened far more slowly.^[27] Hyderabad had been part of the calculations of all-India political parties since the 1930s.^[28] The leaders of the new Dominion of India were wary of a Balkanization of India if Hyderabad was left independent.^[14]^: 223^{[failed verification]}

Hyderabad state had been steadily becoming more theocratic since the beginning of the 20th century. In 1926, Mahmud Nawazkhan, a retired Hyderabad official, founded the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (also known as Ittehad or MIM). Its objectives were to unite the Muslims in the State in support of Nizam and to reduce the Hindu majority by large-scale conversion to Islam.^[29] The MIM became a powerful communal organisation, with the principal focus to marginalise the political aspirations of the Hindus and moderate Muslims.^[29]

Events preceding hostilities[edit]

Political and diplomatic negotiations[edit]

Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, Nizam of Hyderabad, initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth of Nations. This request was, however, rejected by the last Viceroy of India, The 1st Viscount Mountbatten of Burma.^[30]

At the time of the British withdrawal from India, the Nizam announced that he did not intend to join either new dominion,^[31] and proceeded to appoint trade representatives in European countries and to begin negotiations with the Portuguese, seeking to lease or buy Goa to provide his state with access to the sea.^[32]

B.R.Ambedkar, the Law Minister in the first independent Indian government considered the state of Hyderabad to be "a new problem which may turn out to be worse than the Hindu-Muslim problem as it is sure to result in the further Balkanisation of India"^[33] According to the writer A. G. Noorani, Indian Prime Minister Nehru's concern was to defeat what he called Hyderabad's "secessionist venture", but he favoured talks and considered military option as a last resort. In Nehru's observation, the state of Hyderabad was "full of dangerous possibilities".^[33] Sardar Patel of the Indian National Congress, however, took a hard line, and had no patience with talks.^[34]^[35]

Accordingly, the Indian government offered Hyderabad a standstill agreement which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken for one year. According to this agreement India would handle Hyderabad's foreign affairs, but Indian Army troops stationed in Secunderabad would be removed.^[3] In Hyderabad city there was a huge demonstration by Razakars led by Syed Qasim Razvi in October 1947, against the administration's decision to sign the Standstill Agreement. This demonstration in front of the houses of the main negotiators, the Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chattari, Sir Walter Monckton, advisor to the Nizam, and Minister Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung, forced them to call off their Delhi visit to sign the agreement at that time.^[36]

Hyderabad violated all clauses of the agreement: in external affairs, by carrying out intrigues with Pakistan, to which it secretly loaned 15 million pounds; in defence, by building up a large semi-private army; in communications, by interfering with the traffic at the borders and the through traffic of Indian railways.^[37] India was also accused of violating the agreement by imposing an economic blockade. It turned out that the state of Bombay was interfering with supplies to Hyderabad without the knowledge of Delhi. The Government promised to take up the matter with the provincial governments, but scholar Lucien Benichou states that it was never done. There were also delays in arms shipments to Hyderabad from India.^[38]

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was reported to have warned the then Viceroy Lord Mountbatten "If Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims, would rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India."^[33]

According to Taylor C. Sherman, "India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting new recruits to its army and to its irregular forces, the Razakars." The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation.^[3]

In the summer of 1948, Indian officials, especially Patel, signalled an intention to invade; Britain encouraged India to resolve the issue without the use of force, but refused the Nizam's requests to help.^[3]

The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the intervention of the United Nations.^[39]

Telangana Rebellion[edit]

In late 1945, there started a peasant uprising in the Telangana area, led by communists. The communists drew their support from various quarters. Among the poor peasants, there were grievances against the jagirdari system, which covered 43% of land holding. Initially they also drew support from wealthier peasants who also fought under the communist banner, but by 1948, the coalition had disintegrated.^[3]

According to the Indian intelligence Bureau Deputy Director, the social and economic programs of the communists were "positive and in some cases great...The communists redistributed land and livestock, reduced rates, ended forced labour and increased wages by one hundred percent. They inoculated the population and built public latrines; they encouraged women's organisations, discouraged sectarian sentiment and sought to abolish untouchability."^[3]

Initially, in 1945, the communists targeted zamindars and even the Hindu Deshmukhs, but soon they launched a full-fledged revolt against the Nizam. Starting in mid-1946, the conflict between the Razakars and the Communists became increasingly violent, with both sides resorting to increasingly brutal methods. According to an Indian government pamphlet, the communists had killed about 2,000 people by 1948.^[3]

Communal violence before the operation[edit]

In the 1936–37 Indian elections, the Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah had sought to harness Muslim aspirations, and had won the adherence of MIM leader Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, who campaigned for an Islamic State centred on the Nizam as the Sultan dismissing all claims for democracy.

The Arya Samaj, a Hindu revivalist movement, had been demanding greater access to power for the Hindu majority since the late 1930s, and was curbed by the Nizam in 1938. The Hyderabad State Congress joined forces with the Arya Samaj as well as the Hindu Mahasabha in the State.^[40]

Noorani regards the MIM under Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung as explicitly committed to safeguarding the rights of religious and linguistic minorities. However, this changed with the ascent of Qasim Razvi after the Nawab's death in 1944.^[41]

Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his own kingdom, the Nizam allowed Razvi to set up a voluntary militia of Muslims called the 'Razakars'.

The Razakars – who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict – swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau^[3]^: 8 in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union.

According to an account by Mohammed Hyder, a civil servant in Osmanabad district, a variety of armed militant groups, including Razakars and Deendars and ethnic militias of Pathans and Arabs claimed to be defending the Islamic faith and made claims on the land.

"From the beginning of 1948 the Razakars had extended their activities from Hyderabad city into the towns and rural areas, murdering Hindus, abducting women, pillaging houses and fields, and looting non-Muslim property in a widespread reign of terror."^[42]^[43]

"Some women became victims of rape and kidnapping by Razakars. Thousands went to jail and braved the cruelties perpetuated by the oppressive administration. Due to the activities of the Razakars, thousands of Hindus had to flee from the state and take shelter in various camps".^[43] Precise numbers are not known, but 40,000 refugees were received by the Central Provinces.^[3]^: 8 This led to terrorising of the Hindu community, some of whom went across the border into independent India and organised raids into Nizam's territory, which further escalated the violence.

Many of these raiders were controlled by the Congress leadership in India and had links with extremist religious elements in the Hindutva fold.^[44] In all, more than 150 villages (of which 70 were in Indian territory outside Hyderabad State) were pushed into violence.

Hyder mediated some efforts to minimise the influence of the Razakars.^{[citation needed]} Razvi, while generally receptive, vetoed the option of disarming them, saying that with the Hyderabad state army ineffective, the Razakars were the only means of self-defence available. By the end of August 1948, a full blown invasion by India was imminent.^[45]

Nehru was reluctant to invade, fearing a military response by Pakistan. India was unaware that Pakistan had no plans to use arms in Hyderabad, unlike Kashmir where it had admitted its troops were present.^[3] Time magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, the Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India.^[46]

Hyderabadi military preparations[edit]

The Nizam was in a weak position as his army numbered only 24,000 men, of whom only some 6,000 were fully trained and equipped.^[47] These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of three armoured regiments, a horse cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion.^{[citation needed]}

This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab.^[48] 55 per cent of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1,268 Muslims in a total of 1,765 officers as of 1941.^[5]^[49]

In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of civilian leader Kasim Razvi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzle-loaders and swords.^[48]

Skirmish at Kodad[edit]

On 6 September an Indian police post near Chillakallu village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian Army command sent a squadron of The Poona Horse led by Abhey Singh and a company of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles to investigate who were also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona Horse then chased the Razakars to Kodad, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1 Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodad.

Indian military preparations[edit]

On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad,^{[citation needed]} the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen. E. N. Goddard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts – from Vijayawada in the East and Solapur in the West – while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO.

The attack from Solapur was led by Major General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri and was composed of four task forces:

Strike Force comprising a mix of fast moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery,
Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery,
Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units
Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units.

The attack from Vijayawada was led by Major General Ajit Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, one squadron of the 17th (Poona) Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, four infantry battalions were to neutralise and protect lines of communication. Two squadrons of Hawker Tempest aircraft were prepared for air support from the Pune base.

The date for the attack was fixed as 13 September, even though General Sir Roy Bucher, the Indian chief of staff, had objected on grounds that Hyderabad would be an additional front for the Indian army after Kashmir.

Commencement of hostilities[edit]

Indian Army movements during the Operation Polo

Day 1, 13 September[edit]

Indian forces entered the state at 4 a.m.^[50] The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secundarabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori river intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Infantry. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade – part of the Smash force – moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours, paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commandant of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarge, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg.

In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured car cavalry units of the Hyderabad State Forces. equipped with Humber armoured cars and Staghounds, namely the 2nd and 4th Hyderabad Lancers,^[51] but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Mungala by the afternoon.

There were further incidents in Hospet – where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans – and at Tungabhadra – where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.

Day 2, 14 September[edit]

The force that had camped at Umarge proceeded to the town of Rajeshwar, 48 km east. As aerial reconnaissance had shown well entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajeshwar by the afternoon.

The assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6 km from Suryapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha – veterans of the Burma Campaign – and were neutralised, with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties.

At the same time, the 3/11 Gurkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th Cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who determinedly resisted the Indians.^[52]

A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians.

There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikh, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.

Day 3, 15 September[edit]

Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering.

At the town of Surriapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.

Day 4, 16 September[edit]

The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn, but was slowed by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall in spite of sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75 mm guns.

Day 5, 17 September[edit]

In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from Hyderabad, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5 pm on 17 September, the Nizam announced a ceasefire, thus ending the armed action.^[52]

Capitulation and surrender[edit]

Consultations with Indian envoy[edit]

On 16 September, faced with imminent defeat, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan summoned his Prime Minister, Mir Laiq Ali, and requested his resignation by the morning of the following day. The resignation was delivered along with the resignations of the entire cabinet.

On the noon of 17 September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to India's Agent General to Hyderabad, K. M. Munshi, summoning him to the Nizam's office at 1600 hours. At the meeting, the Nizam stated "The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do". Munshi advised the Nizam to secure the safety of the citizens of Hyderabad by issuing appropriate orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major-General El Edroos. This was immediately done.

Radio broadcast after surrender by the Nizam[edit]

Major General Syed Ahmed El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad

It was Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last [1947], a small group which had organized a quasi-military organization surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me. This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless."^[53]

The surrender ceremony[edit]

According to the records maintained by the Indian Army, General Chaudhari led an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on 18 September and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.^[54]

Communal violence during and after the operation[edit]

There were reports of looting, mass murder and rape of Muslims in reprisals by Hyderabadi Hindus.^[20]^[43] Jawaharlal Nehru appointed a mixed-faith committee led by Pandit Sunder Lal to investigate the situation. The findings of the report (Pandit Sunderlal Committee Report) were not made public until 2013 when it was accessed from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi.^[20]^[55]

The Committee concluded that while Muslim villagers were disarmed by the Indian Army, Hindus were often left with their weapons.^[20] The violence was carried out by Hindu residents, with the army sometimes indifferent, and sometimes participating in the atrocities.^[3]^: 11 The Committee stated that large-scale violence against Muslims occurred in Marathwada and Telangana areas. It also concluded: "At a number of places members of the armed forces brought out Muslim adult males from villages and towns and massacred them in cold blood."^[20] The Committee generally credited the military officers with good conduct but stated that soldiers acted out of bigotry.^[3]^: 11 The official "very conservative estimate" was that 27,000 to 40,000 died "during and after the police action."^[20] Other scholars have put the figure at 200,000, or even higher.^[8] Among Muslims some estimates were even higher and Smith says that the military government's private low estimates [of Muslim casualties] were at least ten times the number of murders with which the Razakars were officially accused.^[56]

Patel reacted angrily to the report and disowned its conclusions. He stated that the terms of reference were flawed because they only covered the part during and after the operation. He also cast aspersions on the motives and standing of the committee. These objections are regarded by Noorani as disingenuous because the commission was an official one, and it was critical of the Razakars as well.^[8]^[57]

According to Mohammed Hyder, the tragic consequences of the Indian operation were largely preventable. He faulted the Indian army with neither restoring local administration, nor setting up their own military administration. As a result, the anarchy led to several thousand "thugs", from the camps set up across the border, filling the vacuum. He stated "Thousands of families were broken up, children separated from their parents and wives, from their husbands. Women and girls were hunted down and raped."^[58]

According to the communist leader Puccalapalli Sundarayya, Hindus in villages rescued thousands of Muslim families from the Union Army's campaign of rape and murder.^[59]^{[non-primary source needed]}

Hyderabad after integration[edit]

Detentions and release of people involved[edit]

(From left to right): Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, and Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri after Hyderabad's accession to the Dominion of India.

The Indian military detained thousands of people during the operation, including Razakars, Hindu militants, and communists. This was largely done on the basis of local informants, who used this opportunity to settle scores. The estimated number of people detained was close to 18,000, which resulted in overcrowded jails and a paralysed criminal system.^[3]^: 11–12

The Indian government set up Special Tribunals to prosecute these. These strongly resembled the colonial governments earlier, and there were many legal irregularities, including denial or inability to access lawyers and delayed trials – about which the Red Cross was pressuring Nehru.^[3]^: 13–14

The viewpoint of the government was: "in political physics, Razakar action and Hindu reaction have been almost equal and opposite." A quiet decision was taken to release all Hindus and for a review of all Muslim cases, aiming to let many of them out. Regarding atrocities by Muslims, Nehru considered the actions during the operation as "madness" seizing "decent people", analogous to experience elsewhere during the partition of India. Nehru was also concerned that disenfranchised Muslims would join the communists.^[3]^: 15–16

The government was under pressure to not prosecute participants in communal violence, which often made communal relations worse. Patel had also died in 1950. Thus, by 1953 the Indian government released all but a few persons.^[3]^: 16

Overhaul of bureaucracy[edit]

Junior officers from neighbouring Bombay, CP and Madras regions were appointed to replace the vacancies. They were unable to speak the language and were unfamiliar with local conditions. Nehru objected to this "communal chauvinism" and called them "incompetent outsiders", and tried to impose Hyderabadi residency requirements: however, this was circumvented by using forged documents.

The integration of the princely state of Hyderabad and the making of the postcolonial state in India, 1948-56

Original citation: Sherman, Taylor C. (2007)

Abstract

This article explores the impact of the police action and the anti-communist struggle in Hyderabad on the formation of the Indian state in the first years after independence. Because of its central location and diverse cultural heritage, the absorption of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union was an important goal for Nehru’s government. But the task of bringing Hyderabad into the Union was not an easy one.

As it entered Hyderabad, the government of independent India had to come to terms with the limitations of the police, military and bureaucracy which it had inherited from the colonial state.

As it took over the governance of the state, it had to find ways to manage relations between Hindus and Muslims, even as the social order was being transformed. And it had to fight communism in the Telangana region of the state, whilst trying to ensure the loyalty of its new citizens.

This article examines the ways in which India’s first government confronted these complex problems. The following pages argue that these early years must be seen as a time of great dynamism, rather than as a period of stability inherited from the colonial state.

There is near consensus amongst scholars of postcolonial India that, at least in retrospect, the Nehruvian period was one of relative calm and stability.

According to this line of thought, independence did herald change in India, including the introduction of democracy with universal suffrage and a constitution with a charter of fundamental rights, but the trauma of partition, the war over Kashmir and the integration of the princely states, ‘ensured that precisely those traits of the Raj which Indian nationalists had struggled against were now reinforced’.

The police, military and bureaucracy inherited from the colonial regime, it is agreed, enabled the Congress-led government to ‘enforce central authority’, and to ensure stability in a unified Indian state.

The following pages challenge this view by examining the integration of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. It is argued that this view posthumously invests the colonial state/early postcolonial state with qualities it did not have.

The idea that the colonial state acted as a monolithic machine to stamp out dissent and disorder where it pleased is unsustainable. Central policy was often fraught with contradictions. Institutions, especially the police, courts and prisons, were often overwhelmed by the work thrust upon them during times of unrest.

Tensions between the centre and local administrators frequently erupted, as officers used their position as ‘the man on the spot’ to act contrary to orders or to justify committing acts of violence against the subject population.

Taken as a whole, therefore, the colonial state was often either weak and inefficient or extraordinarily violent and ineffective.

By taking the absorption of Hyderabad as a case study, this work examines the ways in which the new government coped with its inheritance.

Hitherto, the story of the integration of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union has been told from a number of relatively parochial perspectives.

There have been personal stories of hardship and bravery during the conflict; detailed analyses of the tortured negotiations between the Indian government, the Nizam of Hyderabad and the British; clinical accounts of the military operations; and histories of the communist Telangana movement in the territory. None of these accounts, however, have examined the impact of the integration of Hyderabad on the formation of the state in newly independent India.

The absorption of Hyderabad provides an excellent study of the nature of the postcolonial Indian state for three reasons.

First, Hyderabad had been part of the calculations of all-India political parties at least since the 1930s. The territory was therefore a vital part of the self-image of newly-independent India. Secondly, it was the Ministry of States, part of the central government in Delhi, which assumed overall responsibility for the integration of the former princely states.

After the police action of September 1948, the Hyderabad regime was virtually disbanded. As a result, the new authorities had relative freedom to shape the new territory as they pleased.

Finally, as Hyderabad was brought into the Union, police, military and members of the bureaucracy were drafted in from the rest of India to rebuild Hyderabad. One can therefore use the case of Hyderabad not only to try to understand the ‘mind’ of the central government, but to examine the extent to which policies designed by the centre were successfully implemented on the ground.

When they assumed power in Hyderabad, the new Indian government faced an array of questions the answers to which would impact the shape and character of the new nation-state as a whole. These included, how to deal with the limitations of the military, police, and bureaucracy which they had inherited; how to frame the new constitution to protect the integrity of the country; how to manage relations between Hindus and Muslims, whether in the bureaucracy or in the population; and how to fight communism and ensure the loyalty of their new citizens.

This article explores these questions in three sections.

First, it situates the princely state of Hyderabad at the geographic, economic and cultural heart of the sub-continent, and locates the territory in the vision of India imagined by the British and their Indian successors.

Secondly, it analyses the ways in which the Indian authorities addressed the question of relations between Hindus and Muslims after the fall of the Muslim-led government of the Nizam of Hyderabad.

Finally, it turns to the ways in which the Indian army, and then the civilian authorities, confronted the communist Telangana movement in the eastern part of the state. It is argued below that, in the years shortly after independence, India’s internal character had yet to be set in stone, and the experience of the integration of Hyderabad reflects the vibrancy and uncertainty of the early Nehruvian period.

Hyderabad and the Indian Union

The history of the awkward place of the princely states in the transfer of power negotiations is well known. On the eve of independence, several large states, including Hyderabad, had declined to join either India or Pakistan.

Each state presented its own unique problems, but the Government of independent India believed that the accession of Hyderabad to the Indian Union was ineluctable.

As early as June 1947, Nehru had warned he would ‘encourage rebellion in all states that go against us’.10 In the new Indian Government, the accession of the subcontinent’s second largest princely state was viewed as a foregone conclusion because Hyderabad could not be independent except in name, given its geographical position.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s Home member and Minister for States remarked, ‘Hyderabad is, as it were, situated in India’s belly. How can the belly breathe if it is cut off from the main body?

In the summer of 1948, as India’s statesmen, especially Patel, began to hint of an invasion, the British encouraged India to avoid using force, but repeatedly declined the Nizam’s requests to intervene on his behalf.

In the months preceding independence, however, Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur had refused to accede to either India or Pakistan. He attempted, instead, to manoeuvre his state towards independence, from where he could negotiate an alliance with India, rather than amalgamation into India.

To avoid accession, the Nizam’s government had signed a Standstill Agreement with the Government of India. The accord provided that relations between the state and the Indian Union would remain for one year as they had been prior to independence.

India would handle Hyderabad’s foreign affairs, but Indian Army troops stationed in Secunderabad would be removed. Soon after the agreement had been struck, however, each side began to accuse the other of violating its terms.

The Nizam alleged that the Indian government was imposing an informal embargo by using its control over railways leading into the state to deny the territory vital goods, especially arms and medical supplies.

India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting new recruits to its army and to its irregular forces, the Razakars. These moves were regarded in Delhi as part of a ‘comprehensive plan to break up the economic cohesion of India.’

The situation in Hyderabad in 1948

While the Nizam attempted to manoeuvre himself towards independence, the internal situation in the territory was deteriorating. The state had been crippled by communist insurgents on the one hand, and forces loyal to the Nizam of Hyderabad on the other.

To a limited extent, Congress volunteers engaged in satyagraha had contributed to the internal disorder by disrupting courts, filling jails, and engaging in sabotage with the aim of convincing the Nizam to join the Indian Union.

As stories of the conflict in the state spread in India, and refugees fled into the surrounding Indian provinces, the Government of India concluded that the unrest threatened to undermine peace in the whole of India.

When, in 1947, the authorities in Hyderabad refused to accede to either dominion, many opposition parties in the state called for the Nizam to join the Indian Union.

The Congress launched a satyagraha, and encouraged students to leave schools, and lawyers to boycott courts. More radical members of the Hyderabad State Congress planned acts of sabotage, organised raids against government property and communications, and authorised their members to take action in ‘self-defence’, with weapons if necessary.

According to an Indian government note in March 1948, 'the educational institutions function no more, the law courts are barren and the commercial life is shattered.' As many as 21,000 congressmen were said to have been arrested.

However, the Hyderabad State Congress Party was divided organisationally along regional lines, and ideologically between socialists and liberals; its impact on the internal situation in the state, therefore, was more limited than that of the communists.

The fight between the communists and forces loyal to the Nizam, by contrast, was characterised in the spring of 1948 as ‘a people's revolt on the one side and fascist orgy and anarchy on the other’. Its roots were in the insurgency begun in 1944-1945 in the Nalgonda and Warangal districts, known as the Telangana area, in the east of the territory.

Forces loyal to the Nizam of Hyderabad sought to repress this communist movement. These forces comprised of police and military as well as local members of the Razakars.

The Razakars

The Razakars, headed by Kasim Razvi, were a paramilitary organisation comprised of volunteers who were said to be as enthusiastic as they were undisciplined Razvi and his volunteers were associated with the Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul-Muslimein, a political party with considerable influence over the Nizam and dedicated to maintaining Muslim rule in Hyderabad.

Both communists and forces loyal to the Nizam employed brutal measures to strike against their enemy and intimidate villagers into collaboration.

According to a pamphlet that the Government of India had drawn up for public consumption, between 15 August 1947 and 13 September 1948, the communists had murdered 2000 people, attacked 22 police outposts, destroyed village records, manhandled 141 village officials, seized 230 guns, eight revolvers and one rifle, looted or destroyed paddy worth Rs70,000, robbed cash and jewellery worth Rs10,43,668, and destroyed 20 customs outposts.

While the primary fight up until early 1948 had been between the communists and the Nizam’s forces, in May 1948, the Nizam and urban members of the communist party struck an improbable tactical alliance against a common enemy, the ‘bourgeois’ Indian Union.

According to the agreement, which claimed to bolster the fight for the independence of Hyderabad, the Nizam amnestied communists from jails, cancelled outstanding arrest warrants and lifted the ban on the party.

During the summer of 1948, the Razakars continued to seek out and eliminate the enemies of the regime. They targeted not only Hindus, but Muslims whose loyalty was in doubt. As it became clear that negotiations with the Indian Union were stalemated, they also courted confrontation with Indian forces. Their raids against trains and villages in Madras, the Central Provinces (CP) and Bombay raised panic in these provinces.

In July, Razakars killed six Indian Army troops in an ambush near the Indian enclave of Nanaj. Equally, there were allegations that Indian troops crossed Hyderabad’s borders as they gave chase to Razakars.

The Government in Delhi concluded that the increasing influence and violence of these unruly volunteer paramilitaries proved that the Nizam had lost control over his own territory.

These battles threatened to spill into Union territory in more than one way. First, refugees fleeing the disorders escaped into Indian territory to form large camps in the provinces of Madras and Bombay. Some estimates put the number of refugees at 40,000 in CP alone.

Secondly, though the fault lines in the conflict did not run neatly along religious lines, the perceived ‘communal’ nature of the fighting threatened to revive Hindu-Muslim tensions in India.

The Nizam’s government tended to privilege a few thousand Muslims, leaving an underclass of poor Muslims. Nationalist Muslims in the State tended to oppose the Nizam, while, as far away as Delhi, the Socialist Party enrolled Muslim volunteers to agitate against the Nizam.

At the same time, the Depressed Classes Association and Depressed Classes Conference in Hyderabad had joined hands with the Nizam in June 1947 to fight against incorporation into the Indian Union, because they believed accession would entail domination by caste Hindus.

The structure of rule in the state, however, where a predominantly-Muslim government and gentry held power over large numbers of disadvantaged, of whom the majority were Hindus, appeared to divide the population along religious lines.

And some political parties took advantage of this. Since the war, the All-India Hindu Mahasabha had used this government structure to gather support for their organisation.

In 1941 they began to keep a record of all, ‘tyrannous and political injustices and unfairness on the Hindus in all Provinces and particularly under Muslim administration and Muslim states.’31 Hyderabad was no exception.

As the violence of the Nizam’s forces increased in Hyderabad, Hindu nationalists called on Muslims throughout India ‘to give proof of their loyalty to the Indian Union,‘ by opposing the Nizam’s regime.33 Clearly, the subtleties and complexities of the Hyderabad situation were being folded into all-India communal politics.

The Government of India, therefore, concluded that the unrest in Hyderabad threatened to destabilise ‘the communal situation in the whole of India’.

In the volatile international situation in South Asia in the year following independence, Nehru had been reluctant to use force to bring Hyderabad into the Indian Union.

The Indian economy was suffering a crisis of inflation, accompanied by a panic in the gold market, which impelled the Government of India to re-impose controls on textiles and other essential commodities.

In addition, the autumn of 1948 was a tense time for the militaries on the subcontinent. Pakistan had admitted that its troops were present in Kashmir, and Nehru was writing of being at war with its neighbour, albeit an undeclared one.

India feared that any move against Hyderabad would prompt a military response from Pakistan. Though Pakistan had no plans to protect Hyderabad with arms, India did not know this. Moreover, the new government in India was trying to calm tensions after the violence of partition, and struggling to provide for millions of refugees.

The situation in Hyderabad, they concluded, must be resolved before it adversely affected India’s internal and international security.

On 13 September 1948, therefore, the Government of India declared a state of emergency, and sent its troops into Hyderabad State.

During the ‘police action’, the Indian Army entered Hyderabad with the objective of forcing the Nizam to re-install Indian troops in Secunderabad to allow them to restore order in the state. The Nizam

surrendered in four days, and the Government of India appointed Major-General J.N. Chaudhuri as Military Governor. Delhi decided that the Nizam could retain his position as Rajpramukh, though law-making and enforcement power rested with the Military Governor.

Hindu-Muslim relations and the character of the new Hyderabad State

Once they had seized control of the territory, the new Military Governor, Major General Chaudhuri, the Chief Civil Administrator, D.S. Bakhle, and the Government in Delhi had to ask themselves what character and composition they wished the new Hyderabad state to have.

This question involved a number of different elements.

First, to what extent would those who took part in violence before and during the police action be punished for their activities? Secondly, how far would the Muslim-dominated administration in the state be altered? Finally, what role would the Congress Party have in the new state? Given that each of these questions impacted Hindu-Muslim relations, Nehru felt that the decisions which they made in Hyderabad would be seen as the touchstone of the Indian government’s minority policy.

Before the invasion of Hyderabad, Nehru’s primary concern was to normalise Hindu-Muslim relations there and in the rest of the country. He wrote to Patel that, after the problem of the Razakars, all other issues were ‘relatively secondary’.

Before the first Indian troop set foot in Hyderabad, there was much uncertainty over whether the police action would provoke an adverse reaction amongst Muslims in India.

In the state’s surrounding provinces, therefore, provincial governments detained dozens of Muslims, including Members of the Legislative Assembly, for ‘security reasons’, on the grounds that their sympathies with Hyderabad might spur them into inciting unrest.

As troops marched into the state, many Muslims in India lent their support to the police action, however. Prominent Muslims in Delhi publicly welcomed the Government of India’s choice to come to the aid of the ‘innocent masses’ threatened by the Razakars, and appealed for calm.

In the event, there was no trouble in India during the five days of the police action. Indeed, before reports emerged of the fighting within the state, Nehru ventured to declare that Hyderabad had 'suddenly opened out a new picture of communal peace and harmony.'

Quickly, however, stories began to seep out of large-scale violence within the territory in the immediate aftermath of the police action.

It is unclear exactly what happened between the people of Hyderabad, the members of the falling regime, and the invading forces during and immediately after the police action, but it appears that there was widespread bloodshed as the population took the opportunity to commit acts of violence against the Razakars and other Muslims.

Two prominent nationalists, Pandit Sunderlal and Qazi Abdulghaffar prepared a report on the situation after Nehru appointed them to tour the state and assess the extent of the destruction, but the original was suppressed and only scraps of it remain.

They recorded that after 13 September, there had been a widespread anti-Muslim purge, which had occurred primarily in the Marathwada and Telangana areas.

What evidence is available suggests that Hindu residents as well as some members of the Army attacked persons and property in the weeks after the police action began.

Conservative estimates suggest that 50,000 Muslims were killed.46 Others claim several hundred thousand died. Indian troops in some places remained aloof from these activities, in others, they were implicated in them.

Sunderlal and Abdulghaffar concluded that, ‘In general the attitude of the military officers was good but the soldiers showed bigotry and hatred.’49 The invasion of Hyderabad had not heralded a new era of communal harmony in the territory. Instead, the main task of the new authorities in the state was to cope with the aftermath of the turmoil.

In order to depose the existing regime and to contain the unrest, the Government of India’s police and military authorities had detained Razakars, Hindu militants, communists and many others more loosely connected with the general upheaval.

According to their own figures, the military and police detained over 13,000 Muslims, plus several hundred Arabs and Pathans, who were associated with the Razakars and the Nizam’s irregular forces. Another several thousand Hindus were jailed after having been implicated in the post-police action reprisals against Muslims.

Many communists were also detained. But it is clear that, with their limited knowledge of the local situation, the invading forces simply jailed thousands of suspects without real knowledge of their activities.

The police and military were captive to local informants, who took advantage of the situation to have their political enemies imprisoned. Indeed, many of the difficulties which the colonial regime had faced when confronting large-scale communal unrest also affected the early postcolonial government: the police and military were disposed to make mass arrests in order to restore order, and to think about prosecution only after the event.

But court cases often simply provided another arena for the conflict, and the government came under political pressure to release those detained.

Having imprisoned an estimated 17,550 people as they entered the territory, the Government of India was left with the questions of what to do with all the prisoners rounded up in the upheaval, and how to relieve the problem of over-crowded jails.

In Hyderabad, the Government of India inherited a criminal justice system which had been paralysed by the conflict, and could not process any significant number of cases.

This meant that, just as in British India, politics came to determine who was subjected to formal punishment, and who escaped.

Of course, many of the political claims of the Nehru government were different from those of the British: they were concerned not to spend money on expensive legal proceedings which could otherwise be used for development projects; and they were sensitive to the importance of political parties in a democratic age.

For their part, many members of the public remained constant in their insistence that, when the government punished participants in communal violence, this only worsened relations between those communities who were perceived to be at loggerheads with one another.

For these reasons, though thousands were originally detained, only a few exemplary persons remained in jail by 1953.

Given the volume of cases, the military regime decided to prosecute only those ‘who indulged in the worst kind of atrocities’. In the six months following the Nizam’s defeat, therefore, the government released over 11,000 Muslims without trial because no incriminating evidence against them existed.

They also deported some 2000 Arabs back to Aden and a similar number of Pathans to ‘other parts of India’.

Major-General Chaudhuri and his administration planned to prosecute the remainder of those detained. Accordingly, shortly after the proclamation of the State of Emergency, the Government of India propounded a Special Courts Order to dispense with the large numbers of persons in jail. In a word, the order was designed to process cases speedily.

To this end, it relaxed the standards of written evidence by requiring only summaries of the evidence rather than full accounts; it made it impossible for an accused to deliberately delay proceedings, e.g. by hunger striking; and, at first, it provided for no right to appeal to higher courts. This latter provision was amended in October 1949, to allow appeals to the High Court for major offences.

T here was no mention either way as to access to a lawyer, and it appears that while
some of the accused obtained counsel, others declined or were denied access to one. The ordinance strongly resembled those which had been passed by the colonial government during the twentieth century. For example, it incorporated the lessons which the British had learnt by making it impossible for a defendant to delay a case by hunger striking.

In reality, the Special Tribunals were anything but speedy. In each of the courts sat a three-member panel, all of whom had to be present for a case to proceed; when one member was sick or on leave, the tribunal did not meet. Further, English was the working language of the tribunals, but there were few advocates who were able to conduct a prosecution in English.

As the trials made halting progress, thousands languished in jails waiting for the police to finish investigating their cases or for the courts to begin their trials.

By April 1949, appeals for an amnesty were gaining volume. Thirteen Urdu

newspapers jointly asked the government to free Muslims who had been imprisoned

‘on mere suspicion’ and had yet to stand trial. The editors suggested that these men

had suffered in jail long enough, and that their continued detention would serve no

good purpose. To release them would help create a ‘harmonious atmosphere’ in the

state, and it would foster the minority community’s confidence in the government.60

Similarly, Swami Ramandanda Tirtha, leader of the Congress Party in the state,

agreed that the institution of cases for events which had occurred nine months before

was ‘causing great discontent’.

The constraints of governance in a democratic state had an impact in three rather

contradictory ways on the decisions which the government made about these

prisoners.

First, as these men had been detained for several months without trial, the

International Committee for the Red Cross was pressing Nehru to see that those

detained were either prosecuted or released.

Nehru had long since realised that the eyes of the world were on Hyderabad and wished to prove that the new Indian Government could be balanced in its approach to both Hindus and Muslims.

Secondly, it was the widely held opinion amongst the new rulers of the state that the communist and ‘communalist’ parties in the state remained popular because the state Congress Party was weak. Chaudhuri, therefore, hoped that the release of prisoners would ‘rehabilitate the prestige of the Hyderabad State Congress’ Party in the eyes of the public in Hyderabad, and improve relations between the state and national sections of the party.64 Even so, there could be no general amnesty because the Military Governor still wished to prosecute prominent Razakars such as Kasim Razvi.

When the government of Hyderabad, in consultation with the centre, weighed these

arguments, they knew that any policy adopted could not be seen to favour either

Hindus or Muslims. The new government convinced itself that equal blame did attach

to each community.

In Major-General Chaudhuri’s words, ‘in political physics, Razakar action and Hindu reaction have been almost equal and opposite’. Thus, when it was decided to free all Hindus and to institute a programme for the review of Muslim cases with an aim to gradually letting many out of jail, the government preferred that the policy be given no publicity. Releases were staggered and former prisoners made to report periodically to the police.

Because prosecutions of either Hindus or Muslims in cases of ‘communal’ violence tended to elicit allegations of bias, any cases which were brought to court had to be designed to minimise ethnic tensions.

Thus, Kasim Razvi and four of his associates were prosecuted for the alleged murder of a fellow Muslim, Shoebullah Khan.

The victim, a nationalist journalist who had opposed the Razakars, was killed on 22 August 1948. His murder attracted public interest, though only after the police action had begun. The Bombay Chronicle described the journalist as ‘a brave young man’ for refusing to bow to the will of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimein.

The paper went on to declare Shoebullah ‘a martyr in the cause of the people.’69 Though a Special Tribunal found Razvi and his cohorts guilty, they were acquitted in the High Court.

The same men stood accused in the Bibinaga Dacoity Case, which ran simultaneously with the Shoebullah Khan case. In the former, it was alleged that, when passing through Bibinagar station in a train, the accused had shouted 'Shah-e-Osman zindabad', but the people in the station had replied with the nationalist slogan ‘Mahatma Gandhi ki jai’.

The accused then disembarked, and proceeded to burn down a house, and beat and rob those in the vicinity of the station.70 In this case, the High Court upheld the Special Tribunal’s guilty verdict, and the men were sentenced to imprisonment. It was believed that if this type of case were chosen then the prosecutions would be more likely to inspire in the public feelings of pure abhorrence or deep nationalism, rather than enmity between Hindus and Muslims.

As news of the convictions of Razvi and his men reached the public, prominent politicians again pressed Nehru to show generosity to the Muslims of Hyderabad.The Prime Minister was sympathetic. Hyderabadi Muslims, he wrote to Patel, exemplified a unique ‘and rather attractive culture’, and were ‘very much above the average’.

In essence, Nehru argued that Muslim prisoners in Hyderabad were not criminal types, and therefore did not merit punishment. Instead, their behaviour in the summer and autumn of 1948 was analogous to the ‘madness’ that seized ‘decent people’ in the country during partition. Many of those guilty of partition violence remained free in India and lived ‘as respected citizens.’

By this logic, if the crimes of partition could be buried, so could those of Hyderabad’s accession. Nehru also warned that if a gesture of ‘friendliness’ were not offered ‘to those who are down and out and full of fear’ these disenfranchised Muslims could join forces with the communists. Finally, the Prime Minister argued, in a developing state the money spent on prosecution could have ‘brought rich results if spent on constructiveactivities in Hyderabad.’74

When Nehru first voiced these arguments, Patel demurred. He was convinced that

the promise of penal action against criminals had helped restore law and order, and

that if that promise were not fulfilled, it would signal the government’s partiality for

Muslims and would endanger the peace in the state.75 By the time the cases of

Kasim Razvi and of the ex-ministers of the Nizam’s regime had wound their way

through the judicial system, Patel had passed away and elections were about to be

held under a much improved political atmosphere in the state. In January 1952, all

ex-Ministers were released; only Kasim Razvi and a few members of the Nizam’s

regime who had been involved in the most notorious cases remained in prison.76

In the end, only a handful of symbolic Razakars were punished with formal

imprisonment. Just as its colonial predecessor had been, the Indian government

faced administrative constraints which precluded the use of the ordinary judicial

system to dispose of every case arising out of large scale violence.

The police and military, lacking real intelligence or familiarity with the territory, jailed thousands

without obvious cause, and without labouring to find one. Courts, even special

tribunals, were unable to work through the cases at a reasonable speed.

Pleas for amnesty inevitably arose in circumstances in which the members of the public

believed that people were being detained unfairly for protracted periods. Political

considerations, therefore, determined the futures of those who found themselves in

jail.

Intimately tied to these issues was the question of the Hindu-Muslim balance in the

services. The well-known rivalry between Patel and Nehru was crucial in this respect,

as Patel often ran the States Ministry without as much consultation with Nehru’s

Cabinet as the Prime Minister would have preferred.77 Before the invasion, Nehru

had presided over a meeting in which it was decided that, in order to be generous to

the Nizam and to create a positive impression on the other princely states, the

military regime ought to change as little as possible in Hyderabad.

Dramatic administrative and policy changes in the territory were to wait for a democratically-elected government.78 At other levels of administration, however, divergent ideas took hold. The new authorities in Hyderabad attempted to adjust the ethnic balance in the executive, police and administrative services, where Muslims predominated.

To this end, they dismissed over a hundred officers, from the Chief Secretary to low-

level police personnel. 79 They also detained many of those local officers who were

suspected of participating in the violence which accompanied the police action. In

addition, they attempted to reduce the number of Muslims working in the civil service

or sitting as judges through forced retirement, or transfer from the state. They

adopted a policy of not hiring new Muslims in the services. The civilian administration

under Vellodi continued this policy.80 And the government introduced in June 1950

under a scheme of diarchy had similar ideas.81

To replace those dismissed, they drafted in junior officers from Bombay, CP and

Madras. This created greater difficulties, however, as many of the new officers were

not only inexperienced, but were also unable to speak the languages of the people

under their jurisdiction, and were unfamiliar with local conditions.82 This left the

administration generally, and the criminal justice system in particular, unable to

function efficiently or effectively. The Prime Minister objected to these schemes on

the grounds that they were both inspired by ‘communal’ chauvinism and impractical

because they brought in incompetent outsiders.83 Nehru, along with many

Hyderabadis, called for qualified Hyderabad residents to fill vacant posts. However,

the people taking the reigns of power in Hyderabad were able to circumvent these

orders by falsifying residency documents.84 Thus, the answers which were found to

the question of the ethnic composition of the services were neither similar, nor co-

ordinated. It is clear that the new Indian government in Delhi, like its British

predecessor, had to contend with competing visions of the state. These visions were

not identical to those present before 1947, but they were a mark of the continued

inability of the centre to elicit discipline and obedience from the individuals it

employed.

The Congress party in Hyderabad

The final question facing the new authorities in Hyderabad was what the role of the

Congress Party in the state ought to be. Initially, the answer seemed relatively

straightforward to the government in Delhi. Congressmen at the head of the

Government of India wished the Hyderabad State Congress Party to guide the future

of the state. To some extent this decision can be explained by the supposed

ideological affinity between the local and the national party. Technically, the

Hyderabad State Congress had not been part of the all-India party because

affiliations with outside organisations had been banned under the Nizam.

Hyderabad’s Swami Ramananda Tirtha, however, had participated in the non-

cooperation movement in Sholapur, and later made frequent visits to Gandhi. Tirtha

often consulted him on matters of policy, though the two did not always agree.85 In

addition, the all-India party had contributed to the Congress satyagraha in the state in

1938.86 Moreover, the Hyderabad State Congress was also one of the few political

organisations which was not confined to a single linguistic group, and which

attempted to span the entire state. It would be easier to work with a single

organisation rather than with the several linguistic parties.

At the time, however, the Hyderabad State Congress had been in existence for little

more than a decade, and had operated as no more than a token institution before

1946. It suffered from organisational shallowness and internal divisions.87 If it were to

take power successfully, the Hyderabad State Congress Party would need all the

help it could get from the national party. To this end, when they took over the

governance of the state, the Indian authorities ordered the release of all

Congressmen who had landed in Hyderabad’s jails during their campaign of

satyagraha and sabotage before the police action. Before the release, there was

some debate as to whether those who had committed crimes of violence should be

freed. In the event, Congressmen accused of violent crimes were let out, while

communists were kept in jail, whether their crimes involved violence or not.88 Under

these orders, the Government of India released 1222 out of 1736 detenus, and 7893

out of 9218 political prisoners.89

Taylor C. Sherman

20

The situation was far more fluid than had been anticipated, however. As the military

and police attempted to restore order by arranging prosecutions against those who

had partaken in the violence, many Congressmen ended up back in jail. The Military

Governor reported that one faction in the party, ‘has given information against the

members of the other groups for having been concerned in the commission of

atrocities after police action.'90 It became clear that the fissures within the Hyderabad

State Congress would not be easy to repair. Nehru met with Congressmen in the

state to persuade them to bury their differences in the interests of their country.91

V.P. Menon and Sardar Patel, repeatedly pressed the divergent blocs in the party to

adopt a ‘united approach’, but their ‘bickering’ and ‘mud flinging’ continued

unabated.

Thus, though the Government of India originally had intended to

establish a constituent assembly in Hyderabad, and to transfer power to a civilian

government composed of Hyderabadis, within a few months of the police action, both

objectives were soon shelved. The government in Delhi refused to hand power to

democratically-elected representatives when the Hyderabad State Congress

remained in ideological and organisational disarray.93 It therefore orchestrated a

more gradual transfer of power, and did not sanction state-wide elections until 1952.

If the state comprises not only policy, but institutions and individuals, it is difficult to

draw a clear and simple picture of the Indian state during the first months after the

police action because these three levels seem to be pulling in different directions.

Policy coming from the Government of India level was clearly concerned to appear

even-handed in its punishment of participants in the violence which surrounded the

deposal of the Nizam’s regime.

Nehru, at least, was also keen to avoid making

drastic changes to state institutions. But as they took control of Hyderabad, the new

Indian government found itself with poor institutions and independently-minded local

officers. As a result, the composition of the administration in Hyderabad was changed

significantly, and Muslims tended to be disenfranchised during this period. The nature of politics in a democratic state also affected policy, for the centre’s decisions

were designed to improve the stature of the Congress party, and to appeal to certain

members of the electorate. But there were others who were not so easily pleased,

and it is to the communists that we now turn.

The communist insurgency and the making of the new state

When they arrived in Hyderabad, the Indian military found that the communists had

done great damage to the structures of government in the Telangana region, but that

they had also introduced reforms on an impressive scale.

The government, therefore, both fought the communists, and learned from them. Or rather, they fought them first,

and then they learned from them. Their various encounters with the communists

affected the future of India as a whole in many ways. This section will highlight two.

First, some of the oppressive measures used against the movement came to be

incorporated into the new nation’s constitution. Secondly, the development work of

the communists encouraged the government to adopt its own programme of uplift for

the peasantry.

While the main justification the Government of India used as they entered Hyderabad

was to end the ‘communal’ violence, they soon found that the problems in the state

were intimately related to the communist uprising which was flourishing in the

Telangana region of the state, for the violent struggle against the Nizam was centred

in Telangana and led by communists.

The communists drew adherents from a number of fronts. Amongst the poor peasantry and landless labourers, there was great resentment against the jagirdari system of landholding which governed 43 per cent of land in the state. This system was infamous for the high rate of forced labour extracted from peasants who held little land, were given paltry access to water and manure, and were subjected to high rates by (often absentee) landlords.

Moreover, during the Second World War, the burden of a compulsory levy fell heavily on the peasants who were experiencing similar agrarian troubles to those which plagued the

rest of India. Rural areas also lacked facilities for medical care and education. These

factors combined with a system in which customary class distinctions were often

reinforced with brutal violence to leave a large number of peasants alienated from

those who governed them.94 In addition, urban communists and wealthier peasants

had initially fought their own battles under the communist banner, but by 1948, the

coalition between poor and middling peasants had fallen apart.95

In rural areas, the communist cause, led by Ravi Narayan Reddi and organised

under the aegis of the Andhra Mahasabha, sought to alleviate the grievances of the

poor peasants in the Telangana area.96 Though at the outset, they only targeted

zamindars and deshmukhs, the police and military were pulled into the conflict at the

request of local magnates, and by December 1945, the communists had launched a

full-scale agitation against the state. Initially, they assaulted the prestige of

government officials, especially the police. They progressed to boycotting local

revenue collectors and judicial officials, and then to establishing their own

panchayats and courts.

Between July and November 1946, encounters between the

communists and the Nizam’s forces grew increasingly violent, and in the last two

months of that year, the Nizam’s police and military, with the occasional aid of local

Razakars, undertook coordinated action against the communists. The Nizam’s

forces’ tactics were varied.

They cordoned off villages and captured suspected

communists en masse, shot into crowds, burnt villages and engaged in widespread

loot in a manner than that was described by one Congressman as ‘absolutely

indiscriminate and organised.’97 Habeeb Mohammed, the subedar of Warangal, was

later tried for crimes which included murder, and the burning of two hundred houses

in the village of Gurtur. The taluqdar of Nalgonda, Moazzam Hussain, was said to

have ordered the death of twenty ‘innocent Hindus’ after a group of several hundred

communists had attacked and killed several dozen Razakars.98 The communists

responded with ‘punishment’ against government officials and suspected

collaborators. Their measures were said to be more targeted but equally brutal.99

Accounts of the action taken by both sides were documented by the Government of

India, 100 by politicians such as Sarojini Naidu’s daughter, Padmaja Naidu,101 and

they also appeared in the press.

When it became clear that the communists had not laid down their arms when the

Indian Army arrived, the Military Governor adopted a policy of rooting out

communists wherever they were found. Rhetoric was found to match. Nehru

instructed Chaudhuri that the fighters in Telangana should not be referred to as

communists, but as terrorists.

The Prime Minister wrote, ‘too much talk of

communists confuses the issue because communists in other countries function

differently.’103 He made a distinction between communists in the Soviet Union and

Indonesia who opposed imperialism, and those fighting the free government of

independent India. To add factual support to this discourse, the Government of

Hyderabad drew up a pamphlet entitled ‘Communist terrorism in Hyderabad’. The

pamphlet’s message was simple:

the Communist hooligans of Hyderabad have carried forward their

campaign of crime to an extent that assures it a prominent place in

any anthology of destruction.104

Government forces, it was implied, had the right to use force to restore order, and to

remove these outlaws from the territory. The means adopted to dislodge the

communists were also heavy-handed. By December 1949, the police and military

had jailed over 6000 persons without trial, and yet the ranks of communists seemed

to be growing.105

Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution and the situation in Hyderabad

Though these detentions did not have much effect on the communist movement, they

did have a profound impact on the shape of the Indian Constitution, which was

finalised during this crucial period in the country’s history. As the document was

being drawn up by the Constituent Assembly, the sub-committee on Fundamental

Rights was given the task of articulating the legal, political and social rights of the

new citizens of the Republic of India.

B.R. Ambedkar drew up a set of rules for

arrest and detention which would suit India’s unique needs. After many revisions, the

substance of Ambedkar’s final, multi-part article provided for very little protection

against long-term detention without trial. It laid down rights for those arrested or

detained, but then stated that these rights did not apply to those held under

preventive detention laws which might be passed by the legislatures.107 Ambedkar

justified the text on two grounds.

First, India was in great turmoil: refugees, economic

crisis, uncertainty over princely states and the rise of communism throughout the

country justified the use of preventive detention. Secondly, it was not a ‘practical

possibility’ to expect the current executive, judicial and administrative system to

process and review large numbers of detentions, given the current political situation

in the country.

The infrastructure they had inherited was inadequate for the work at

hand. If the constitution were to endow citizens with the right to have their cases

reviewed in less than three months, as critics of the clause had suggested, then

thousands would have to be released because courts and review boards would fail to

meet the deadline.

It would be easy to conclude that these measures signalled the willingness of the

Government of India’s new leadership to anchor their power in the country by any

means necessary. However, the articles adopted in the constitution must be seen in

the context of the recent past in India. That most Congressmen had been detained

without trial for several years during the recent war affected the way that detention

was viewed in the country. Imprisonment without trial was seen as a measure

necessary in the face of grave danger. But the inveterate legalism of the leadership

of the nationalist movement encouraged them to try to articulate in law the precise

terms on which that power could be exercised. And yet, with knowledge of the

weakness of the institutions which they had inherited, the constitution makers were

unwilling to be tied down. The clause was the uneasy result of a compromise

between legalism and pragmatism.

Civilian administration and the victory of the generous

Just as the constitution came into force, the political situation in Hyderabad began to take a new direction.

In December 1949, the Military Governor’s administration ended, and M.K. Vellodi replaced Major-General Chaudhuri at the head of the new civilian administration in Hyderabad. Vellodi toured the Telangana districts and found that the authorities stationed in the area had not dealt with the communist cause ‘with any understanding’. He testified that, 'the villagers who had been alternately beaten up by the Military and the Police and the communists had a haunted look.

This section examines how the civil administration won the war with a combination of more responsive policing, and more aggressive programmes of development.

Though the communists were branded ‘terrorists’ in public, the government quietly

learned lessons from them. It was clear that the communists had earned the support

of the people because they had tapped into grievances which the Indian government

in the state had not begun to address. Assessing the achievements of the

communists in the field of social and economic uplift, the Intelligence Bureau’s

Deputy Director deemed them ‘positive and in some cases great.’110 The communists

had redistributed land and livestock, reduced rates, ended forced labour and Members of the government in India were not ignorant of the significant influence of agrarian uplift on the political situation. Indeed, Nehru encouraged the Ministry of states to view the problems of the peasantry in Hyderabad in the context of the ‘great

agrarian revolution ...taking place over these vast areas of Asia’.112 In light of the

communist uprisings in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia in 1948, it was obvious to the

more discerning members of India’s governing class that the communist movement

appealed to those in Telangana who suffered under conditions of socio-economic

distress.113 Indeed, soon after the police action, Swami Ramananda Tirtha and his

group in the State Congress cautioned Nehru that the use of force against

communists would have to be supplemented with agrarian reforms in order to strike

at the ‘root cause’ of the movement.

As the state’s first Chief Minister, Vellodi initiated a number of more nuanced military

measures designed to disrupt the communist movement. He replaced the Brigadier

in charge of the Telangana area, who spoke no Telugu, with Captain Nanjappa of the

Indian Civil Service, who acted as Special Commissioner in the region.115 Review

committees were constituted to consider the cases of prisoners who were elderly,

infirm, or were no threat to security.Within a year over 5000 detenus were

freed.117 Nanjappa substituted the sweeping and heavy-handed operations of the

military with small police parties which worked on the basis of intelligence.118 Home

guards and village patrols were organised to assist the police.119 In the beginning of

1951, Nanjappa gave secret instructions to start a ‘whispering campaign’ to let it be known that those who laid down their arms voluntarily would have their cases

‘favourably considered.’

The authorities also began to build or repair infrastructure from roads and wells to

dispensaries and schools. They passed a Tenancy Act, which was designed to

improve the rights of tenants by capping landholdings, opening the market to

cultivators, and protecting tenants from ejection.

Although land reforms were not implemented in a uniform manner, and they did not go far enough in many areas, the

Act went some way to recognising peasant grievances. A Tribal Reclamation

Scheme was introduced in Warangal, under which two teams of Social Service

Officers were constituted to ‘redress grievances and create contentment’ amongst

the inhabitants of the area.123 To this end, they travelled through rural areas, and

tried to settle any outstanding disputes, and alleviate all major difficulties in the lives

of the villagers. These officers aimed to see that vacant government land was

allotted, tenants’ rights confirmed, disputes with absentee landlords settled, land

taken by moneylenders restored and debts reconciled. Having been allotted a lump

sum of two lakhs, and an annual budget of 1.38 lakhs, they arranged for the supply of

essential commodities such as cloth, kerosene and iron at subsidised prices.124

Police and Revenue officials who visited tribal people distributed medicines, sold

cheap cloth, and handed out free dhotis, sarees, soap, slates and books. As a result,

noted the Deputy Central Intelligence officer with a hint of surprise, ‘their cooperation

with the forces of law and order in this division is most spontaneous.’125 They were

even helping to capture communists.

There are indications in the available documents, however, that these schemes were

not without elements of coercion. The hill tribes in the area, the Koyas, Chenchus

and Lambadas, were said to have had connections with the communists, who used

them as couriers, and their settlements as hide-outs.

In order to disrupt the association between the two, the tribes ‘were uprooted from their villages inside the forests and made to live nearer to human habitation.’128 By February 1951, 7000 out of 30,000 Koyas in the Warangal area had been settled in villages under this scheme. It was widely reported that, because re-located tribes people lacked basic

facilities such as drinking water, they and their livestock fell victim to hunger and

disease.

Measures for the uplift or simple relocation of tribesmen and of the peasantry,

whether forced or voluntary, seemed to have drawn many away from communist

influence. As a result, the communists had difficulty securing food, water and

ammunition from the population.

Moreover, the Communist Party of India (CPI)

was divided over whether to continue the violent struggle in Telangana, or to

participate in the general elections due the following year.132 In Hyderabad, the

movement split along the same lines. Raj Bahadur Goud, and Maqdoom Mohiuddin,

members of the City Communist Party, as well as Ravi Narayan Reddi, a prominent

leader of the Andhra Mahasabha came out of hiding to disassociate themselves from

the violent movement. They were promptly arrested.133 After seeking guidance from

Moscow and Beijing, the CPI and the Andhra Mahasabha called off the armed

struggle in the state in mid-October 1951. Top-ranking communists visited the

state to support the call for a turn to electioneering. Though the change in policy did

not satisfy all members of the movement, it brought about a formal end to the

Telangana struggle. In 1952, the various parties of the left in the state united to

form the People’s Democratic Front to contest the forthcoming general elections.

The fight against the communists can be divided into two phases, the first executed

by the military, the next orchestrated by the civilian administration. The military phase

of the campaign bore remarkable resemblance to military action during the British

period. Hampered by a dearth of intelligence, and blinkered by the over-riding imperative to restore order, their over-bearing acts of oppression and indiscriminate

punishments produced either bitter quiescence or unending antagonism in the

subject population. The Indian government in Hyderabad came into its own when

Vellodi took power at the head of a civilian administration. Vellodi and Nanjappa

‘discovered’ that if they could slake the population’s thirst for basic goods, the

government could win their loyalty as well. And, marking a crucial departure from the

British period, they found the funds necessary to achieve this end.

This can be seen as part of a larger, global shift both in the nature of governance

more generally and in counter-insurgency tactics in particular. After the second world

war, the nature of citizenship changed as the responsibility of the state for the social

and economic welfare of its population was greatly expanded. At around the same

time, the British, too, began combating the communist insurgency in Malaya with

measures designed to ameliorate the economic conditions in the countryside.

The leadership of the new Indian nation quickly grasped the notion that if they were to

earn and retain the loyalty of the people of India, they would have to fulfil the

promises of the nationalist movement and provide uplift for the common people. If

they failed in this task, they risked losing the allegiance of villagers, peasantry and

labourers to communists who promised the prosperity that the Congress party could

not deliver.

The end of Hyderabad

Hyderabad’s fate, in the final account, was intimately connected with that of South

India as a whole. Since independence, significant sections of the population had

urged the Government of India to re-divide the provinces in India along linguistic

lines. Hyderabad, situated in the centre of South India, and populated by four distinct

linguistic groups, was elemental to this vision of India. Indeed, as the existence of

Hyderabad kept these groups from being unified with their linguistic brethren, it was

seen by some as the ‘centre of gravity of the British Empire in India.’ Socialists in

the new nation detested the feudal conditions extant in the state, and believed that

the system could only be abolished by dismembering every element of the Nizam’s

regime.

The disintegration of Hyderabad, in these views, was essential in order to

establish real swaraj in India.

Though he cautioned against repeating the sins of partition, Nehru conceded that, in

principle, if there was ‘strong and widespread’ support for the re-drawing of India’s

internal borders, then ‘a democratic government must ultimately submit to it.’139 In

Hyderabad, politics had long moved along linguistic lines, and the major players,

including the Andhra Mahasabha, and the faction of the Congress Party led by

Swami Ramananda Tirtha, favoured the break-up of the state.

The People's Democratic Front, the socialists and the Peasants and Workers Party participated in

the campaign for the disintegration of the state as well. In addition, the

incorporation of Hyderabad into the Indian Union had emphasised the importance of

local officers who spoke the local language of the population. This realization,

combined with the agitation for linguistic states, tipped the balance against the

continued existence of Hyderabad. In 1953, the state of Andhra Pradesh was carved

out of Madras. In 1956, the Telugu-speaking regions of Hyderabad, including

Telangana, were joined with the new province. And Hyderabad’s Marathi speakers

were eventually amalgamated into the new state of Maharashtra, and its Kannada

speakers into Karnataka.

Conclusion

In light of the experience of Hyderabad, how can one characterise the state in

independent India? Though this article only concerns Hyderabad, the police military

Taylor C. Sherman

31

and bureaucracy which form the basis of this analysis were drafted into the state

from outside, and, though one must be cautious, it is possible to draw conclusions

which range beyond the borders of the former princely state. It is clear that, while

there were some continuities, there were also sharp differences between the colonial

and postcolonial state. When the members of the new government took over the

institutions left behind by the British, they inherited many of the constraints of the

colonial system. Courts were easily overwhelmed by unrest; prisons continued to be

used as holding cells, rather than as disciplinary institutions; the police and the

military were often clumsy and heavy handed, especially in the first phase of the

occupation; and local officers could not always be relied upon to implement the

centre’s policies as directed. The colonial apparatus simply did not provide the

stability and coherence which many scholars have presumed.

The new Government of India was able to integrate Hyderabad into the Indian Union

because it was innovative. These innovations were inspired as much by pragmatism

as by democratic concerns and ideological change. Because the Congress Party was

concerned to assert its influence over the voting population, members of the

government tended to formulate policies to serve this end. Intimately connected with

the democratic imperative was the new socialist ethos which influenced government

policy. Whether inspired by the communists of Telangana, contemporary practices of

counter-insurgency, or Nehruvian socialism, the postcolonial state was more directed

towards the uplift of Indian villagers. It quickly learned that development programmes

could be more effective than coercion in certain circumstances.

Above all, the rulers of independent India were remarkably flexible, particularly during

the first few years after 1947. In Delhi and in Hyderabad members of government

were not, as a whole, intractably loyal to any single idea. They were willing to adapt

their policies to changing facts on the ground. This means that they did not fight all their battles in the same way: in Hyderabad development was an important element

in their fight against communists; in other places, other tactics predominated.

In Hyderabad, new styles of governance had to be developed precisely because

postcolonial India did not possess the institutional framework necessary to fight

communists using the oppressive powers of the colonial police, military and

bureaucracy. If later governments were able to secure their tenure by using these

institutions, they did so only after significant change. Indeed, the military changed

structurally and doctrinally after 1947.

Operation ‘Polo’ and Impact & Ramifications on India’s First Kashmir War

Operation ‘Polo’ and Impact & Ramifications on India’s First Kashmir War By Brig Amar Cheema Issue: Net Edition | Date : 27 Nov , 2021 War ravaged Britain was constrained to scuttle her liabilities, i.e. her global empire, including the jewel in the crown – India, the keystone of her Asian empire.

Objectively speaking, the 108 hours campaign undertaken to liberate the Princely State of Hyderabad, codenamed Operation (Op) Polo stands out as India’s ‘first’ military success.

Having said that, in view of its timing, (September 1948), and the forces it ‘dislocated,’ at a time when India was fighting a grim war in Jammu and Kashmir (J & K) and, it cannot be denied that the campaign deflected India’s operational focus and undermined the nation’s ‘main’ effort.

To recapitulate the operation situation: By the time the Hyderabad operation was eventually undertaken, Pakistan had already annexed what is now ‘Azad’ Kashmir, occupied Gilgit and cut off Ladakh by capturing Skardu and Kargil.

Despite such major operational reverses, Polo was still allowed to run its course, despite the fact that it ‘fixed’ combat resources desperately needed to restore the situation in Kashmir.

This is not to suggest that the situation in Hyderabad did not require intervention, it did, but it is advocated that the situation could have been timed/handled differently.

Admittedly, it is easy to build a hypothetical case with the ‘undue’ advantage of hindsight, the aim is to highlight the ramifications Polo had on Kashmir – a conflict that India not only lost in strategic terms, but which continues to cast its shadow on India’s progression.

War ravaged Britain was constrained to scuttle her liabilities, i.e. her global empire, including the jewel in the crown – India, the keystone of her Asian empire.

Before coming to Hyderabad and Kashmir, Britain’s ‘post war’ compulsions need to be recapitulated.

Despite emerging victorious, five years of gruelling war had sapped Britain financially; apropos, whatever visages of Pax Britannica she still harboured had to be (finally) laid to rest.

War ravaged Britain was constrained to scuttle her liabilities, i.e. her global empire, including the jewel in the crown – India, the keystone of her Asian empire. Concurrently, after Stalin’s crushing defeat on Nazi Germany and his expansion into Europe, Soviet Russia had emerged as the new and ‘larger than life’ adversary.

A vicious Cold War had already erupted and World War Three was expected to break out at any time between the former allies. Cutting to the bone, the competition was over oil, the ‘liquid gold,’ as control over the ‘wells of power’ not only yielded enormous economic power, but also fuelled the war machines of the new imperialists.

Energy rich Gulf and the Middle East being the immediate spoils and since the Soviet shadow over the Gulf loomed large, the threat was clear and present.

Lord Wavell, India’s penultimate Viceroy, was the one to give practical shape to Mr. Churchill’s brainchild and it was he who transformed England’s economic liability of the times into a strategic opportunity.

By fructifying the creation of Pakistan, he ensured that a bulwark against Soviet expansionism was finally put in place. With this strategic masterstroke, he also ensured Britain’s post-war strategic relevance for the new superpower – the USA, as it created the possibility for the use of military bases in Pakistan (Peshawar and Karachi); located on the flank of the Soviet Union, which were invaluable for retaining control over the Gulf.

At the same time, creation of Pakistan also counter-balanced a potentially powerful India, whose support to the Soviet bloc due to the socialist leanings of her leadership could not be relied upon.

The creation of a ‘credible’ Pakistan, therefore, was therefore England’s strategic requirement and Lord Mountbatten who replaced Wavell and then presided over the division of India and guided (sic) India through the Kashmir war was candid in admitting: “Having created it (Pakistan), its survival had to be ensured.”

The Princely State of Kashmir being a part of their new creation was essential, as without Kashmir, or at least the parts she went on to annex, Pakistan’s heartland (Rawalpindi) remained vulnerable to a swift Trans-Jhelum offensive.

Since English leaning during the Kashmir war are well-documented, they do not merit to be recounted. However, it needs to be pointed out that the impasse over Hyderabad’s refusal to accede to India, offered yet another way for the English to facilitate Pakistan’s war in Kashmir.

By ensuring Indian deployment around the state, the English mandarins entrenched in South Block weaved a web of despondency and managed to balance the IndoPak force ratios in Kashmir.

The upshot was that though Hyderabad was eventually liberated (after Lord Mountbatten had demitted office), ten months of diffused operational focus contributed largely to India’s inability to wrest the advantage in Kashmir.

the impasse over Hyderabad’s refusal to accede to India, offered yet another way for the English to facilitate Pakistan’s war in Kashmir.

The Hyderabad State in 1947- 48 With a population of 1.634 crores, not only was the state the most populous, but also the richest amongst the 542 Princely States and Provinces that formed British India.

Occupying a pivotal place in the Deccan, the seventeen districts that made up the Nizam’s state, included Aurangabad in the North West and Gulbarga in the south. Since Berar was already under the British, it had already come under Independent India.

At the same time, Sholapur, which formed an enclave in the west provided the shortest axis to Hyderabad. A map to highlight the extent of India’s second largest Princely State is given above. Unlike J & K, which had a Muslim majority (77 percent), Hyderabad only had thirteen percent Muslims, though they held 97 percent of the public posts and controlled the army.

Land-locked Hyderabad had well-developed links and was socio-economically conjoined with her neighbours. Though the state had her own currency, the economy was well integrated with British India, so much so that Indian currency was used concomitantly.

This was unlike the case of J & K, which not only had a common border with Pakistan, but also was economically dependent on her for her survival.

Like Maharaja Hari Singh of J & K, Asaf Jah VII, the Nizam of Hyderabad, fabled to be one of the richest man in the world, did not want to lose his independent status.

…unlike Hari Singh’s dithering on the decision of accession, as early as 26 June 1947, the Nizam issued a

However, unlike Hari Singh’s dithering on the decision of accession, as early as 26 June 1947, the Nizam issued a ‘Firman’ (Royal proclamation) announcing his intent neither to join with India nor Pakistan.

On the other hand, he sought an independent (dominion) status. Though this was rejected in view of the insular nature of the state,

Mountbatten went on to offer a ‘standstill’ arrangement brokered through his ‘Tory’ friend, Sir Walter Monckton, who at that time was well entrenched as the Nizam’s Constitutional Advisor.

Taking advantage of the distraction provided by Pakistan’s tribal aggression, on 27 October, i.e. the day India intervened militarily in Srinagar, the Prime Minister was taken in custody on instructions of the Razakar leader, Kasim Razvi.

The Razakars were the private army of the fundamentalist Ittehad-ul-Musilmeen party and wanted to extend the writ of Islam over the length and breadth of South India. In that, they had the support of Hyderabad’s Commander-inChief, Major General El Edroos, an Arab mercenary.

Rattled by the developments but helpless against the fundamentalists, the Nizam succumbed and appointed Mir Laik Ali, the nominee of Razvi as the new Prime Minister; de-facto control thus shifting to the separatists.

The leadership in New Delhi, pre-occupied with the war in Kashmir still preferred to negotiate and an (inconsequential) standstill was finally signed on 29 November. Emboldened by Delhi’s demure reaction(s), Laik Ali pressed for the removal of Indian Forces and concurrently renewed efforts for supply of arms from Britain and Pakistan.

Despite Hyderabad’s declared neutrality, he appointed an agent for Pakistan and even extended a loan of Rs 20 Crores to help her war with India.

Concurrently, the strength of Razakars was increased and by the spring of 1948, armed raids on Indian enclaves and border villages and the growing belligerence of the Razakars, made it incumbent for the Indian government to finally act. The strength of Hyderabad’s forces is tabulated, and though they may appear numerically strong, they were poor in training and in terms of armaments.[1]

‘Firman’ (Royal proclamation) announcing his intent neither to join with India nor Pakistan.

Indian Forces India and Pakistan shared the military assets of British India based on a ration of 2:1. However, despite the numerical advantage India enjoyed, the forces deployed by her in J & K and those opposite Hyderabad in the winter of 1947 is tabulated to present the bias.

This is despite the fact that at that stage, there was a full-fledged war going on in Kashmir, compared to only a ‘preventive’ deployment around Hyderabad.

In addition, vital assets, including air and armour were widely distributed against a trumped up Pakistani threat against the Indian states of Rajputana, Kathiawar, Assam and Bengal. Pakistan may have been worse off, but she had the advantage of hordes of fundamentally charged tribals.

Conduct of Op Polo Though it is not intended to go over the detailed conduct of the campaign, an overview to highlight the fact that the opposition was highly over-rated and operational difficulties were deliberately played up by the English Generals who ran the show in South Block is presented.

As per the appreciation carried out by Major General CE Pert, then commanding the Armoured Division (18 November), substantiated by Lieutenant General EN Goddard, the Southern Army Commander (28 November), it was assessed that the Indian forces stationed in Secunderabad would be incapable of defending themselves and being vulnerable, should be moved out.

While this must have been correct, rather than building up their strength, assets were relocated out of Hyderabad, which would have encouraged the Razakars.

The decision to pull out forces was despite the fact that as early as 20 January, the Government of India had specifically tasked Southern Command to ‘prepare a plan to ensure the safety of lives and property of Indian nationals and to prevent raids into India.’

Though, the intent may be defensive, it can be inferred that the situation was serious and required a military solution. Thus, prepositioning and preparation were important.

The Issue of Timing and Force Levels General Goddard presented his plan for the offensive into Hyderabad on 3 February and recommended a multidirectional offensive with the main thrust, spearheaded by the Armoured Division to be launched from Sholapur, synchronised with ‘holding’ operations to pin down state forces on the borders.

Had the plan fleshed out in the first week of February been executed early, considerable forces could have been released for operations in Kashmir during the ensuing summer.

The situation in Kashmir needs to be co-related, as by then (February-March 1948), apart from regaining control over the valley, India had already lost Mirpur, Bhimber, Kotli, Rajauri, Muzzaffarabad, Chakothi and Gilgit, while Naushera, Punch, Uri, Bandipore, Skardu and Kargil were under threat.

While it had been calculated by South Block that additional forces for Kashmir could not be sustained logistically, ways and means to at least bolster the forces fighting in the plains of Jammu could have been improvised.

In any case, combat air assets which are inherently flexible and whose aggressive employment could have made a major difference, were also fixed around Hyderabad against an illusionary threat.

Neither was India’s superiority in terms of armour ever considered to recapture Bhimber and Mirpur, located in the plains opposite Akhnur. Indeed, it was paradoxical that the open corridor from Akhnur leading to Mirpur was never exploited.

On the other hand, repeated requests for desperately needed forces were deftly deflected; unfortunately for India and Kashmir, English counsel was allowed to prevail over the Indian leadership.

In terms of timing, since the decision to execute a military option had been accepted in principle, it may have been prudent to complete the operation at the earliest. Not only would this have freed Indian forces, but also denied preparation time to the adversary. Ideally, March could was suitable as the bulk of the forces were in place and the monsoons were still two months away.

Dithering and delays proved costly in the context of the Kashmir war. Conduct of Operations Despite the stated aim for ‘executing a rapid seizure of Hyderabad’ without worrying about the Lines of Communication,[2] the offensive that went in was deliberate and methodical.

Notwithstanding, against a cautious time envelope of fifteen days, General Chaudhari, forced an unconditional surrender on Edroos within five days, exposing the myth of superiority of Hyderabad’s forces and the hype around the Razakars and the motley lot of Irregulars.

However, Chaudhari still had the difficult task of rounding up the separatists and though Razvi was picked up, this took time and consequently, no forces could be made available from Hyderabad for Kashmir.

The progress of operations, thrust lines and forces employed are annotated on the map: Conclusion Despite many distraction(s), it was creditable that the campaign was still taken to its logical conclusion.

There was palpable synergy not only within the Army and the Air Force, but also with the Civil Administration. In the words of Major General (later Chief) JN Chaudhuri, the architect and principal actor: (it) was a brief incident, satisfactorily planned and against forces, who after the third day, virtually collapsed.’

Having said that, the question this account started with remains: Was this operation needed? If so, could it have been timed/executed differently?

Though this hypothetical question has more political than military connotations, it highlights the importance of ‘deciding on the ‘right’ action at the ‘right’ time.’

Complex challenges are emerging on India’s strategic horizon and it is incumbent on the new leadership that has taken guard in New Delhi that not only do they work out their priorities, but also think through ‘how’ and ‘in what manner’ they should act/react.

‘Fighting/preparing for the ‘right’ war at the ‘right’ time with the ‘right’ forces is the panacea for success but to ensure this, operational contingencies need to be thought through with deliberation and preparations ensured in peacetime.

…combat air assets which are inherently flexible and whose aggressive employment could have made a major difference, were also fixed around Hyderabad against an illusionary threat.

OPERATION POLO: Annexation of Hyderabad: End of Nizam Rule

Operation Polo was the code name of the Hyderabad "police action" in September 1948, by the then newly independent Dominion of India against Hyderabad State.

It was a military operation in which the Indian Armed Forces invaded the Nizam-ruled princely state, annexing it into the Indian Union. At the time of Partition in 1947, the princely states of India, who in principle had self-government within their own territories, were subject to subsidiary alliances with the British, giving them control of their external relations.

With the Indian Independence Act 1947, the British abandoned all such alliances, leaving the states with the option of opting for full independence. However, by 1948 almost all had acceded to either India or Pakistan.

One major exception was that of the wealthiest and most powerful principality, Hyderabad, where the Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, a Muslim ruler who presided over a largely Hindu population, chose independence and hoped to maintain this with an irregular army. The Nizam was also beset by the Telangana rebellion, which he was unable to subjugate.

In November 1947, Hyderabad signed a standstill agreement with the Dominion of India, continuing all previous arrangements except for the stationing of Indian troops in the state. Fearing the establishment of a Communist state in Hyderabad by the rebels and the rise of militant Razakars, India invaded the state in September 1948 following a crippling economic blockade.

Subsequently, the Nizam signed an instrument of accession, joining India. The operation led to massive violence on communal lines, at times perpetrated by the Indian Army. The Sunderlal Committee, appointed by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, concluded that between 30,000-40,000 people had died in total in the state, in a report which was not released until 2013. Other responsible observers estimated the number of deaths to be 200,000 or higher.

Day 1, 13 September Indian forces entered the state at 4 a.m. The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secundarabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade.

Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori River intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Infantry. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade – part of the Smash force – moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours, paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commandant of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through.

This armoured column reached the town of Umarge, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg.

They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory.

Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg. In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured car cavalry units of the Hyderabad State Forces. equipped with Humber armoured cars and Staghounds, namely the 2nd and 4th Hyderabad Lancers, but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Mungala by the afternoon.

There were further incidents in Hospet – where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans – and at Tungabhadra – where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army. Day 2, 14 September The force that had camped at Umarge proceeded to the town of Rajeshwar, 48 km east.

As aerial reconnaissance had shown well entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajeshwar by the afternoon.

The assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6 km from Suryapet.

The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha – veterans of the Burma Campaign – and were neutralised, with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties. At the same time, the 3/11 Gurkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th Cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who determinedly resisted the Indians.

A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians. There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikh, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.

Day 3, 15 September Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering. At the town of Surriapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town.

The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.

Day 4, 16 September The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn, but was slowed by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions.

However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall in spite of sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas.

The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75 mm guns. Day 5, 17 September In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from Hyderabad, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5 pm on 17 September, the Nizam announced a ceasefire, thus ending the armed action.

Radio broadcast after surrender by the Nizam Major General Syed Ahmed El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad It was Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last [1947], a small group which had organized a quasi-military organization surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me.

This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless."

The surrender ceremony According to the records maintained by the Indian Army, General Chaudhari led an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on 18 September and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.

◼ CDT Soham Ganguly 20 Bengal Bn NCC Regt.no.: WB21SDA123727 Ramakrishna Mission Residential College

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